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Abstract
A choice correspondence is weak justified if a non-chosen alternative is dominated by any
other obtainable alternative, and for each discarded alternative there is some chosen alternative
which dominates it. This definition allows us to build a connection between the behavioral
property expressed by the weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority and a weak form of maximality.
It is weaker than the form of maximality characterized by the weak axiom of revealed preference.
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1 Introduction
Eliaz and Ok (2006) accommodate preference incompleteness in revealed preference theory by
studying the implications of weakening the fundamental choice-consistency condition of the weak
axiom of revealed preference (WARP) in the weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority (WARNI).1
They show that WARNI implies that the revealed preference relation (not necessarily complete)
is regular, reflexive, and transitive whenever the domain of choice D includes all unit sets of its
underlying universal domain X and is closed under finite union; furthermore, the converse holds
under the technical assumption that D includes all countable subsets of X. Eliaz and Ok (2006)’s
specification of D is a weak specialization of the abstract choice domain exploited by Richter
(1966), Kim (1987), and Bandyopadhyay and Sengupta (2003). Nevertheless, this specification is
not the appropriate domain of choice for many important economic problems (Herzberger, 1973;
Suzumura, 1983). For example, a choice domain D which includes all unit sets of its underlying
universal domain X and is closed under finite union violates the classical postulate of Walras’ law
(as observed by Herzberger 1973, p. 233), and this violation reduces enormously the empirical
attraction of a revealed preference theory that allows for the empirical validity of the integrability
conditions without the need to assume a particular functional form of preferences (Blundell, 2005).
Moreover, most interesting problems in consumer economics must often rely only on a finite number
of observations, i.e, ’consumer budget surveys’ (Blundell, 2005). Last but not least, the observed
behaviour is often inconsistent with the WARP and it opens the problem of assessing the nature
of consumer (ir)rationality by using observational data alone (Blundell, Browning, and Crawford,
2003). This motivates the question in the title.
In this paper we follows the guidelines of revealed preference theory; we define a choice correspon-
dence C on an arbitrary choice domain D; and we introduce a weaker notion of maximality, as
follows. We say that a choice correspondence C over D is weak justified if there exists a binary
relation J on X (dubbed weak justification) such that, for any feasible set, no available alterna-
tive is J-related to any chosen alternative, and for each rejected alternative there is some chosen
alternative which is J-related to it. Therefore, the binary relation J is a strict (not necessarily
complete) preference relation; and a decision-maker makes weak justified choices if she can assert
that non-chosen alternative is dominated by any other obtainable one, and for each discarded alter-
native there is some chosen alternative which dominates it. Our form of maximality is weaker than
that introduced by Mariotti (2008), but stronger than that of asymmetric motivation introduced
by Kim and Richter (1986) - and obviously stronger than the von Neumann-Morgenstern stable
set.
Our main result is that a choice correspondence C on D is asymmetric weak justified if and only if
it satisfies WARNI.
1On a finite universal set WARNI is identical to one of the behavioral properties suggested by Bandyopadhay and
Sengupta (1993).
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2 Analysis
Let X be a non-empty set of alternatives. Let D be the collection of non-empty subsets of X. A
choice correspondence C is a map defined on D such that ∅ 6= C (S) j S for every S ∈ D.
A binary relation J j X × X is said to be asymmetric if, for all x, y ∈ X, (x, y) ∈ J implies
(y, x) /∈ J .
If there exists a binary relation J on X such that, for all S ∈ D:
i) ∀x ∈ C (S) ,∀y ∈ S : (y, x) /∈ J
ii) ∀y ∈ S\C (S) : (x, y) ∈ J for some x ∈ C (S) .
(2.1)
then we say that J is a weak justification for C. If C has a weak justification, we say that C is
weak justified. We will call J an asymmetric weak justification if J is asymmetric and satisfies i)
and ii) for all S ∈ D. If C has an asymmetric weak justification, we say that C is asymmetric weak
justified.
Our form of maximality is weaker than that provided by Mariotti (2008), according to which a
choice correspondence C on D is justified if there exists a binary relation J on X such that, for all
S ∈ D:
i0) ∀x, y ∈ C (S) : (y, x) /∈ J
ii0) ∀y ∈ S\C (S) ,∀x ∈ C (S) : (x, y) ∈ J .
(2.2)
Therefore, J is not necessarily complete in both (2.1) and (2.2). However, while (2.2) requires
that all chosen elements are J-related to all non-chosen elements, (2.1) requires that for each non-
chosen element there exists some chosen element which is J-related to it. Furthermore, our form of
maximality is stronger than the asymmetric motivation relationM introduced by Kim and Richter
(1986). A choice correspondence C on D is asymmetric motivated if there exists an asymmetric
binary relation M on X such that, for all S ∈ D,
x ∈ C (S) iﬀ /∃y ∈ S : (y, x) ∈M .
Therefore, a weak asymmetric justified choice correspodence is an asymmetric motivated one as
an asymmetric motivation coincedes with the part i) of an asymmetric weak justification. Finally,
asymmetric weak justification also bears similarities to von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set. That
is another structure that weakens maximization. Let R be an asymmetric relation on X. Then, the
set V is a stable set solution of (X,R) if the following conditions are satisfied: i00) Internal Stability :
∀x, y ∈ V , (x, y) /∈ R; ii00) External Stability : ∀y ∈ X\V , (x, y) ∈ R for some x ∈ V . For an
asymmetric weak justification internal stability is required, whilst external stability is strengthened
to: ∀y ∈ X\V : (x, y) ∈ R for some x ∈ V and (y, x) /∈ R for all x ∈ V .
Eliaz and Ok (2006) suggest to read the statement “x ∈ C (S)” as “x is revealed not to be inferior
to any other obtainable alternative in S” rather than to follow the classic interpretation of “x is
revealed to be at least as good as all other available alternatives in S”. Under this interpretation of
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revealed preferences, they propose the weak axiom of revealed non-inferiority (WARNI). The idea
behind this behavioral regularity is quite mild. It asserts that if an obtainable alternative from a
set S is revealed not to be inferior to all of other chosen alternatives from S, then it must be chosen
from S as well.
WARNI. ∀S ∈ D, y ∈ S : [∀x ∈ C (S)∃T ∈ D : y ∈ C (T ) and x ∈ T ]⇒ y ∈ C (S).
This behavioral postulate is weaker than WARP which asserts that if x ∈ C (S) and there exists
a feasible set T such that y ∈ C (T ) and x ∈ T , then y ∈ C (S). Furthermore, WARNI implies
the canonical Property α (also known as Chernoﬀ choice-consistency condition or basic contraction
consistency), according to which an alternative that is deemed choosable from a feasible set S and
belongs to a subset T of S must be deemed choosable from T (i.e., x ∈ T j S and x ∈ C (S) ⇒
x ∈ C (T )).2
Theorem 1 shows that an asymmetric weak justified choice correspondence diﬀers from an asym-
metric justified choice correspondence, whilst Theorem 2 shows our main result that a choice
correspondence C on D is asymmetric weak justified if and only if it satisfies WARNI.
Theorem 1 There exists a choice correspondence C on D that is asymmetric weak justified but
not asymmetric justified.
Proof. Let X = {x, y, z}. Suppose that D = {{x, y} , {z, y},X}. Define C on D by C (X) =
{x, z}, C ({x, y}) = {x}, and C ({z, y}) = {z, y}. It is easy to see that C is asymmetric weak
justified, but not asymmetric justified. For suppose that C is asymmetric justified. Then, since
C (X) = {x, z}, we must have (x, y) , (z, y) ∈ J . But C ({z, y}) = {z, y} implies that (z, y) /∈ J
yielding a contradiction.
Theorem 2 A choice correspondence C on D is asymmetric weak justified if and only if it satisfies
WARNI.
Proof. Assume that C is asymmetric weak justified. We show that C satisfies WARNI. Let S ∈ D,
with y ∈ S, and suppose that for every x ∈ C (S) there exists T ∈ D such that y ∈ C (T ) and
x ∈ T . As C is asymmetric weak justified it follows that (x, y) /∈ J for all x ∈ C (S). Assume, to
the contrary, that y /∈ C (S). Because C is asymmetric weak justified it follows that there exists
x ∈ C (S) such that (x, y) ∈ J yielding a contradiction.
For the converse, let C on D satisfy WARNI. We show that C is asymmetric weak justified. Define
for all distinct x, y ∈ X:
(x, y) ∈ J ⇔ ∃S ∈ D : x ∈ C (S) , y ∈ S\C (S) , and @T ∈ D, x ∈ T : y ∈ C (T ) .
2See Eliaz and Ok (2006, lemma 1, p. 81).
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Then J is asymmetric. To show that C satisfies property i), let x ∈ C (S) and y ∈ S for some
S ∈ D. By way of contradiction, let (y, x) ∈ J . Then there exists S0 ∈ D such that y ∈ C (S0),
x ∈ S0\C (S0), and for all T ∈ D, with y ∈ T , x /∈ C (T ), which contradicts that x ∈ C (S) and
y ∈ S. Finally, we show that C meets property ii). Suppose that y ∈ S\C (S) for some S ∈ D.
WARNI implies that there exists x ∈ C (S) such that for all T ∈ D it holds true y /∈ C (T ) if x ∈ T .
It follows that (x, y) ∈ J .
It is worth noting that Theorem 3 does not follow from Eliaz and Ok (2006) as our result relies on
a more general domain of choice. Furthermore, Theorem 2 implies that our notion of maximality
is not vacuous in the sense that not all choices have an asymmetric weak justification. Finally,
we observe that a choice correspondence satisfying WARNI is rationalized by a unique asymmetric
weak justification J whenever the domain of choice D includes all pairs.
Theorem 3 If J and J 0 are two weak asymmetric justifications on a nonempty set X such that
max {S, J} = max {S, J 0} for all S j X with |S| = 2. Then J = J 0.
Proof. Let x, y ∈ X, with x 6= y. Let
(x, y) ∈ J ⇔ {x} = max {{x, y} , J} = max©{x, y} , J 0ª⇔ (x, y) ∈ J 0.
The statement trivially follows.
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